Perspectives on how to approach current investment juncture

i. What is the right framework to conceptualize US / China relationship? The Thucydides trap? A symbiotic Chimerica redux? Is the Hong Kong related volatility an opportunity to position in a jurisdiction that underlined its importance to both China and the Western world and earned among the highest marks regarding Covid-19 response?

ii. Credit assets are cheap from the perspective of a V shaped, U, swoosh recovery associated with immensely powerful policy responses. Will it ‘ be different ‘ this time or human ingenuity and collective single-minded focus on defeating Covid-19 will prevail? What is exactly different this time? The business cycle impact of the Spanish Flu barely registered ahead of the roaring 20s in the World War I immediate aftermath. The aptly non PC named 1968 ‘ Hong Kong flu ‘ may have been the culprit behind the equivalent number of excess deaths in the US as Covid-19 today, it never registered as a financial asset driver, let alone as a societal mega-disruptor

iii. How should one be thinking about the increasing bifurcation of outcomes between workers and asset holders? About boomers vs millennials, the financial asset acquisition profile, the respective balance sheets, cash flows and ‘ maintenance and incurrence covenants ‘? How will markets be impacted by differing experiences during the Covid recession, which exacerbated exiting trends, what are the political implications ahead of an intensification of the political cycle?

iv. How shall we be internalizing the discrete game changing policy developments in Europe the last 2 months ( German fiscal response, debt mutualization, regulatory policy coordination ) in light of the secular European asset underperformance / US Outperformance over the last decade? Where do you opportunities lie in peripheral Europe?

v. How should one approach the drastic potential impact of the recent events on the real estate industry, sports, education as well as fintech? Yes, one overestimates the short run at risk of underestimating the long run; if I venture a forecast we run this risk in terms of higher education, fintech, but we run the opposite risk in terms of commercial real estate and sports.